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IIITRODUCTIOII
Since the end of the Second World War, developing
nations in the Asian region have employed various strategies 
to speed up their industrialization and modernization 
processes. One move which has found favor among Asian
governments and has achieved varying degrees of success is
the establishment of export processing zones (EPZ). By 
offering a suitable package of investment incentives to both 
foreign and domestic entrepreneurs setting up of modern 
manufacturing plants within certain defined areas, it is 
hoped that overseas capital and technology can be attracted 
to accelerate economic growth and to promote exports.
China's special economic zones (SEZ) are being 
developed with similar objectives in mind and are basically 
modelled after the EPZ system. The SEZs are set up as 
experimental laboratories to test new concepts and policies 
of development and to expedite the process of modernization 
in China. Although China is a relative late-comer in this 
field of development, the SEZs have attracted a great deal 
of attention from all over the world partly because EPZs arS 
typically found in countries with market economies, whereas 
SEZs are the product of an open economic policy in a 
socialist country. Much interest has been focused on the 
feasibility and implications of adopting such a model of 
development in a socialist setting. The purpose of this
1
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paper, therefore, is to trace the establishment of SEZs, to 
analyze the impact of open-door policy, to explore the 
investment environment to foreign investors and to make some 
predictions about future prospects in SEZs.
More than one decade ago, the Chinese leader, Deng 
Xiaoping,* approved the formation of SEZs--the first child 
of China's Economic System Reform. This focuses on China's 
new economic initiative program, which features different 
sizes of private and semi-private firms and other aspects of 
economic reforms. It examines the implications of China's 
efforts, their success or failure, and the place of foreign 
businesses in this program. However, one event in 
particular, the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 
June of 1989, has cast a great shadow on China's reforms. 
What impact would it have on the experiment laboratory-SEZ? 
Would SEZs be still so attractive to foreigners? How would 
SEZs survive? These are the topics the author will discuss 
in this paper.
This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one 
deals with the background of the establishment of SEZs in 
China and includes an analysis of a) the political
environment, b) the economic and living standards, c) the 
foreign trade bottle-neck, and d) the establishment of SEZ. 
Chapter two looks at the success and problems in the 
Shenzhen* SEZ, including the topics of a) Shenzhen-China's
boom town, b> electronic business in Shenzhen, c) local
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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private business in Shenzhen, d ) contributions to inner 
China, e) brisk Shatouj iao, and f> problems in Shenzhen. 
Chapter three discusses an overall evaluation of the 
investment environment in terms of a) the investment
environment, b) the administrative structure, c> the legal 
system, d) the banking and financial structure, e> the 
preferential treatment and investment incentives, f) the tax 
system, and g) the labor cost and productivity. Chapter four 
focuses upon a future perspect for SEZs in China and surveys 
a) austerity drive and political upheaval and b> impacts of 
1997. Following chapter four is the summary and conclusion 
of the foregoing four chapters' discussions from the 
author's perspective.
As the nature of this paper is non-experimental, the 
data collected is mainly from Mansfield Library and China's 
official red-head d o c u m e n t s . * Statistics from other sources 
are also taken into consideration in the analyses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER ONE 
SEARCH FOR A NEW MODEL - SEZ 
Political Environaent
The basic Stalinist political system and economic 
development model adopted by China in the 1950s was a highly 
centralized version of the Leninist system similar to 
Lenin's own communism of 1918. All key economic, cultural, 
and social entities were nationalized, and along with the 
national party and state organs, they were run as a single­
party-social bureaucracy. Divided into functionally defined 
subsystems, such as those for finance and trade, for 
industry and communication, and for ideology and culture, 
this rapidly expanding bureaucracy monopolized decision 
making in all spheres. Individual units in this system 
tended to become multifunctional; for example, ministries, 
factories, or hospitals provided not only their main 
products or services but were also responsible for housing, 
medical care, education, counseling, and recreation for 
their employees. In a pyramid-style hierarchical structure, 
lower-level entities were absolutely dependent upon higher 
levels and were subordinate to their command.
Efforts to reform this basic model began early and 
continued throughout the next thirty years. Two competing 
modifications of the Stalinist model emerged: a radical, 
decentralized Stalinism associated with Mao Zedong, and a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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moderate Leninism identified with Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun.*
By 1969, the "moderates" gathered around Zhou Enlai 
were able to convince Mao that the almost total isolation of 
China from the rest of the world had driven the country into 
a very precarious and vulnerable position. A series of 
policy modifications in the 1970s led to China's 
normalization of relations with the United States, Japan and 
many other countries. The exception was the Soviet Union and 
the East European bloc. A major consequence of this policy 
change was a dramatic expansion of economic transactions 
between China and the capitalist countries. Trade with non­
communist countries increased from US$3.5 billion in 1970 to 
US$12.2 billion in 1975.
This policy shift, however, encountered persistent 
resistance from the ideological left led by the "Gang of 
F o u r . " Beginning in 1974, Zhou Enlai and later Deng 
Xiaoping, who had been rehabilitated from political disgrace 
in 1973, became the targets for heated political criticism 
from this left-wing faction. Zhou was accused of being "an 
expert in fawning on foreigners" who had consistently 
"begged for foreign capital economically." ® Deng was 
charged with lust for foreign technology and equipment, and 
opposing the principles of independence and self-reliance.* 
Deng was consequently dismissed immediately after the death 
of Zhou.
The death of Mao in 1976 and the subsequent downfall of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the "Gang of F o u r "paved the way for the return to power of 
the twice-purged Deng Xiaoping and the official launching of 
the Four Modernizations' in 1977. A more relaxed and 
flexible approach to self-reliance and interdependence soon 
evolved: self-reliance was regarded as a long-term goal
rather than as something to be put rigidly into immediate 
practice. Establishing contacts in all spheres with foreign 
countries means "absorbing the good experience and 
techniques from abroad for our own use so as to enhance our 
self-reliance capabilities and build China into a powerful, 
modern socialist country before the end of this century."*
Apart from stating that self-reliance is to be a long­
term goal rather than an immediate necessity, the Chinese 
media has carried out a major ideological campaign to
reinterpret Mao's principle of self-reliance. The hope is 
that this principle may be harmonized with the new economic 
programs which seek to resolve the practical needs of 
contemporary China. The reinterpretation of Mao's principle 
of self-reliance in China after 1976 emphasizes four major 
points: (a) the "Gang of Four" is alleged to have distorted
the principle and exploited it for their own political
gains; (b ) the study of foreign ideas and the import of
foreign technology do not contradict the basic tenets of the 
principle; (c) the change in economic and political 
conditions both within China and abroad makes it favorable 
today to adopt a more flexible approach to the issue of
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self-reliance? and (d> a discriminating and planned 
absorption of foreign ideas and technology will further 
strengthen China's national self-reliance in the long run,
China has now recognized that self-reliance can only be 
a long-term goal and can only be realized through the short­
term importation of factors of production such as 
technology, capital and management expertise from the 
developed countries. These imports are meant to tackle the 
current problems of China's economy. Participation in the 
international division of labor, borrowing from foreign 
banks and governments and setting up of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) are conceived as means to finance these imports 
and are thus given much weight in the current drive toward 
the modernization of China.
Economic and Living Standards
After the downfall of the "Gang of F o u r , " the Chinese 
economy deteriorated to such an extent that it fell into "an 
unsound economic cycle of high speed, high accumulation, low 
efficiency and low consumption." Measures to break the
cycle were thus urgently required and a great strategic
shift in China's socialist economic development was
necessary. As far as external economic relations are
concerned, SEZs represent part of the Chinese answer to
their economic problems.
The growth rates of China's Industrial and agricultural
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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productions have on the whole been fairly high. Between 1958 
and 1978, the average annual growth rate of the gross value 
of Industrial and agricultural output was 7.6 percent, with 
Industry growing by 9.7 percent. However, compared to 1957, 
the total output value produced per hundred Ren Min B1 (R M B ) 
of Industrial fixed assets had declined by 256.4 percent by 
1978, while the profits and taxes turned over per hundred 
RMB of funds fell by 30.3 percent. With more capital Input 
and lower output of profits and taxes, the economic results 
clearly declined. Consequently, the high average annual 
growth rates of China's economy could only be sustained by 
very high accumulation at the expense of the people's 
everyday needs. The average wage for workers and staff 
members of state-owned enterprises rose from RMB 637 In 1957 
to RMB 644 in 1978, an increase of only 1.1 percent over a 
period of 21 years. Since the cost of living index for 
workers and staff members of state-owned enterprises rose by 
14.3 percent during the same period, real wages actually 
declined. The livelihood of the farmers was also difficult. 
The converted average wage of per capita Income In 1957 was 
RMB 40.5, while In 1990 It was RMB 517.'
If the trend of declining economic results cannot be 
reversed by drastic changes In the economic development 
strategy, the targets set for the Four Modernizations by the 
turn of the century are unlikely to be met. To reverse the 
trend, more open foreign trade policies are required.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Foreign Trade Bottle-neck
Up until 1978, Chinese foreign trade displayed five 
major characteristics.
(1) The small volume of trade
In terms of gross value (measured in RMB),China's 
foreign trade in 1977 was merely 6.6 times that of the low 
level of 1950. Consequently, in spite of its vast size and 
huge population, and a modest rise in its total trade value, 
China's proportion of the total value of world trade dropped 
from 1.4 percent in the 1950s to 1.1 percent in the 1960s 
and to only 0.8 percent in the 1970s, signifying that 
China's external economic links were shrinking during this 
period.
(2 ) Fluctuations in the rate of growth
The growth rate of foreign trade has not been stable. 
In every year from 1949 to 1979, the gross value of foreign 
trade increased from that of the previous year except for 
three major periods of fluctuation: a big drop in the three
years after 1960, and two drops during the Cultural 
Revolution, which was a period of political interference 
from "leftists" who interpreted self-reliance narrowly.
(3) Changes in trading patterns
In the 19508, some 65 percent of the gross value of
China's foreign trade was with the Soviet Union and East
European countries. After the rupture in Sino-Soviet
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relations at the end of the decade, trade began to shift 
towards the capitalist market. This process accelerated 
during the 1970s with the improvement of China's relations 
with Japan, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
United States. However, China's trade with these capitalist 
countries was and still is in deficit. Chinese export 
commodities have difficulty in penetrating foreign markets. 
<4) Changes in the structure of foreign trade
The fastest growth in export trade was recorded in 
light industrial products and textiles, and petroleum and 
chemical products which took over the place traditionally 
occupied by agricultural and mineral products. During the 
twenty-four years from 1955 to 1979, the proportion of 
agricultural and agriculture-related products dropped from 
55.7 percent to 22.2 percent of the gross value of total 
exports, while that of light industrial products and 
textiles grew from 26.9 percent to 42.7 percent and heavy 
industrial products ( including petroleum ) grew from 17. 4 
percent to 32.1 percent. In the import trade, producer goods 
dominated the scene, except in the period between 1960 and
1965 when economic difficulties, a readjustment of the
economy and large increases in grain purchases boosted the 
import of consumer goods to 40 percent of the total- In the 
1970s, imports of consumer goods declined and settled at 
about 19 percent. Nevertheless, the Chinese government now 
recognizes that in the present structure, exports of h i g h -
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q u a l i t y  products with well known brand names are lacl<ir.g, 
and the import of c o mplete sets of equipment is considered
to be an inefficient method of te c h n o l o g i c a l  upgrading.
(5) Un i f i e d  state control
T h r o u g h o u t  the period from 1949 to 1979, foreign trade
was conducted under strict, unified state control. On the 
one hand, this is r e c o g n i s e d  to have had the merit of 
h e l p i n g  China to maintain its balance of international
payments; but on the other hand, it has discouraged the 
i n i t i a t i v e  of the p r ovinces and other local units to promote 
exports.
However, since 1978, r e cognition of the inefficiency of 
the trading system has stim u l a t e d  ;ew and more innovative 
m e t h o d s  of trading. The adoption of less rigid trading 
p o l i c i e s  and trade fin a n c i n g  rep r e s e n t  a new attem.pt to give 
the n e c e s s a r y  f l e x i b i l i t y  to C h ina's trading system and to
its rapidly i n creasing import trade.
Establishing SEZ
In 1978, the two southern coastal provinces of China, 
G u a n g d o n g  and Fujia.n, were granted c o n s i d e r a b l e  autonomy in 
the d e v e l o p m e n t  of foreign trade. Subsequently, the concept 
of SEZ was disc u s s e d  and ideas were formulated. The first 
i n i t i a t i v e  to be taken was the f o r m u l a t i o n  of an industrial 
c o n e  on the Ghekou Peninsula. The official status of Shekou
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as a special economic zone was granted on January 1, 1979.
The Idea of setting up the Shenzhen, Zhuhal and Shantou SEZ
was first discussed in July 1979, but a iinal decision was 
not reached until the end of 1979 and their egal status was 
not granted until August 26,1980.^* The Xiamen SEZ was
designated in October, 1980, two months after the Guangdong 
SEZ.
In order to justify the establishment of the SEZs, many 
Chinese scholars and officials have tried to affirm the 
socialist nature of these zones. They have attempted to find 
ideological support in the works of Marx and Lenin. While 
they do not have much success with Marx, they have found a 
few statements of Lenin useful and relevant to their
justification. At first the policy researchers focused on 
Eastern European models, but they very q .ickly began to 
experiment with the concepts and methods of Western 
development economics. Researchers and policy-makers became 
more aware of the growing gap between China's performance 
and that of capitalist countries. Consequently, the policy­
makers thought that a small element of capitalism in the 
national economy was incapable of undermining socialism, 
especially if the impact of the SEZ is confined to defined 
limits. Up to this moment, with a mixture of socialism, 
state capitalism and foreign capitalism, SEZ was finally 
established.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER TWO 
SUCCESS AMD FAILURE IR SHENZHEN 
Shenzhen-China*e Boon Tovn
As the most productive of China's four SEZ, (soon there 
will be six with the addition of the undeveloped new 
province of Hainan island and an industral area of Shanghai, 
Pudong), Shenzhen has a completely different feel from the 
rest of China. “
Less than a decade ego, Shenzhen was a sleepy railroad 
town of 30,000 whose main attraction was as a place to 
change trains between Hong Kong and People's Republic of 
China, a pleasant subtropical hamlet on South China Sea. 
Today, Shenzhen has a population of 700,000, traffic Jams, 
ultramodern architecture including China's tallest building, 
and a hustling, free-for-all frontier atmosphere.
Capitalizing on its adjacency to Hong Kong, Shenzhen is a 
boom town bustling with activity and enterprise, where 
hotels and shops quote prices in Hong Kong dollars instead 
of RMB. China's special economic zones are designed largely 
for export manufacture and have their own liberal rules and 
tax laws for foreign and joint enterprises. In contrast to 
export processing zones elsewhere in Asia, the Shenzhen SEZ 
was planned as a comprehensive economic entity, embracing 
tourism, manufacturing and agricultural production, as well 
as commercial and real estate development. However,
13
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Industrial growth has been accorded top priority and
Industrial production will form the basis of the zone's 
economy. Shenzhen is still in the formative period and has 
had some problems fulfilling this objective. The main reason 
is that investments in industry require a large capital 
outlay and a long period of return, whereas in real estate 
development, for example, the period of return is short and 
the profit margin is high. Furthermore, the lack of an
efficient administrative, legal and financial system has 
also deterred many potential investors from putting large 
sums of capital into manufacturing undertakings. They prefer 
to wait and see how things develop before committing
themselves. The inadequate provision of infrastructure also 
has a negative effect on investment. As a result, overseas 
participation in the initial period of Shenzhen's industrial 
development was confined primarily to small enterprises or 
businesses involved in intermediate processing of assembly 
work.
Despite the fact that tourism and real estate
development have initially had greater success than
manufacturing in attracting overseas capital to Shenzhen, 
the number of investment projects in industry far exceeds 
that of other activities. In August 1981, 66 percent of the
total number of projects in Shenzhen were connected with 
manufacturing, ** and by the end of 1989, the figure had 
increased to 83.7 percent. These covered a wide variety
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of ventures ranging from the basic light industries such as 
electronics and textiles to more sophisticated industries 
like motor vehicle assembly, printing and container 
manufacture. However, the industrial structure of the
Shenzhen region has so far been heavily biased toward light 
industrial production.
Electronic Business In Shenzhen
In 198"7, Shenzhen became China's leading city for
electronics exports, accounting for almost 25 percent of 
country's total--$202 million. Its main export products are 
color televisions (almost a million units) and tape 
recorders (more than 7.5 million, almost half of China's 
total production). Shenzhen's ambition is to become one of
world's leading producers and exporters of VCRs.
In 1989, 43 percent of the special economic zone's
total annual output of US$1.37 billion was electronic 
products. Seventy percent of the electronic output comes
from the Shenzhen Electronic Group (S E G ). Established in
1985 by the municipal government, SEG now consists of 155
companies. 45 of those are joint ventures with foreign or 
domestic companies. One of the group's biggest companies is 
Huagiang Sanyo Electronics Co. Ltd., a joint venture in 
which Japan's Sanyo Corp. owns 49 percent. The operations, 
scattered in several plants, produce 1,200 color television 
sets a day, some with remote control and some with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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electronic tuning. It also produces 1,200 stereo cassette 
radios daily under the Sanyo and Fisher labels. Many of the 
component8 -picture tubes, circuit boards, semi-c inductors 
come from Japan.
SEG exports 55 percent of its output. Of its remaining
production, 30 percent 3 sold in main nd China and the
rest in Shenzhen's own . rming economy. Until the austerity 
program began in 1988, S E G 's growth had been spectacular. In 
1986, its first full year of operation, SEG's revenue was 
US$257 million; in 1987 revenue was US$359 million, another 
40 percent increase. But in 1988, revenue fell for the first 
time to US$327 million, a victim of the Chinese austerity 
program. For SEG, 1991 should shape up as a better year. 
Probably the best news for SEG was the central government's
decision in 1990 to cut the tax on color television sets to
an average of US$58 per set.
Shenzhen's electronics factories rely heavily on Hong 
Kong as a first destination for end products; about 80 
percent of foreign investments in Shenzhen are through Hong 
Kong companies. Many of Shenzhen's electronics are shipped 
first to Hong Kong, then exported to final destinations.
Shenzhen is eager to produce more sophisticated 
consumer electronics, and is anxious to take over from Korea 
as major source of technology. The problem is that the 
Japanese only want assembly projects in China. They don't 
want to share the technology. Shenzhen authorities have even
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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more plans. They are looking for big American partners and 
hope to build a plant to supply U.S market in the Mexico 
border zone, either as a wholly owned project or as a joint 
venture.
Local Private Business In Shenzhen
Shenzhen was established in 1979 to facilitate 
international trade and give experimental private ownership 
firms the opportunity to succeed. Many private by operated, 
state-licensed firms have been started as a result of the 
recommendations of the Chinese Research Society for the 
Modernization of Management. In China, a small business is 
broadly defined as an enterprise with less than one thousand 
employees. Some small businesses in other parts of China 
operate under state and local government control. In 
Shenzhen, small businesses function more freely. One of the 
successes of China's open-door policy is the growth of small 
business operations, relative to the large state-owned 
companies which, until recently, were predominant.
These new, small businesses are very flexible and can 
turn out new products in shorter periods of time than other 
Chinese enterprises. In addition, they have become a major 
source of new employment and are providing much needed 
modern technologies.
Individuals or groups that contracted with the state to 
conduct small business operations enjoy higher incomes than 
their counterparts who work for a monthly salary. Based on
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the contract or lease agreement, a percentage of profits is 
paid to the state while the remainder is used by the 
contractors for salaries, reinvestment, and a welfare 
program which includes community and/or staff bonuses. For 
example, one of the individually owned small enterprises in 
Shenzhen was the brainchild of two middle-aged Chinese. The 
owners held degrees in engineering and had worked for the 
same state corporation for nine years. Taking advantage of 
the reformed system, the two partners raised RMB20,000 in 
capital to manufacture electronic components for local 
factories. The company currently employs 110 workers with an 
average income of RMBl,100 per month, as compared to the 
RMB400 grossed by the owners when they worked for the state 
in Shenzhen. Both owners and workers expressed great 
satisfaction in their ability to succeed. The company 
contributed money to the state through corporate net income 
tax and personal income tax system that is required by the 
government if your monthly income exceeds RMB800.
The successful operation of small businesses in 
Shenzhen, has promoted several reforms to attract both 
Chinese and foreign enterprises to the zone. For example, 
businesses in SEZ operate under more liberal administrative 
policies than other enterprises in China. Except for small 
businesses started by individuals in Shenzhen, the ownership 
of "initiative-based contract responsibility system" 
enterprises still rests with the state. But the contractor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is said to enjoy full managerial authority, with the 
government not interfering in management decisions unless 
the operation becomes unprofitable. The individual 
contractor is put on probation after the first year in which 
the enterprise fails to generate profit. A subsequent year 
of no profit usually results in the cancellation of the 
government contract. An enterprise in Shenzhen can employ 
workers based on their qualifications and make labor 
contracts with these employees. Enterprises outside the SEZ, 
on the other hand, receive employees as authorized by the 
state, regardless of the particular enterprise's needs and 
requirements.
The Contribution to Inner China
One of Shenzhen's key contributions to the national 
economy was, and still is, to provide links within China. 
The local government leaders want units in other parts of 
China to invest in Shenzhen's development and to cooperate 
to help raise Shenzhen's level of technology. They send 
cadres to visit advanced research and technology centers in 
various parts of China, especially in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and the Northeast. Central government leaders are 
favorably disposed to help Shenzhen, and Gu Mu, “ with a 
small group he headed directly under the State Council, 
provided a critical liaison to make this possible. His 
strong identification with the zone's success made it easy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for local officials to confide in and work with him.
By 1981, as Shenzhen began to take shape, many
enterprises in other parts of China were eagerly responding 
to the call of Beijing to establish branches there.
Companies found that it was an attractive base for the final 
preparation of goods for export and for gaining information 
about new technology and new export opportunities. By 1987, 
over two thousand "domestic link" ventures, under some
twenty-five different central government ministries, had 
established Shenzhen offices.
The enterprises that responded most eagerly to the call 
to set up branches in Shenzhen were generally "third front" 
enterprises. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the enterprises 
had been moved inland when Chinese leaders,preoccupied with
foreign tensions, feared establishing industry in coastal 
areas. After reforms began, the government was not only
reluctant to make new investments in poorly located inland 
plants but encouraged them to move and establish branches 
elsewhere to help achieve profitability in the new area of 
more open markets. Shenzhen afforded an opportunity to set 
up a branch that could absorb new technology and pass it on 
to its old inland plant. The branch could also obtain better 
information about market opportunities abroad and could
package and market the company's products or get the home
plant to adapt products accordingly.
There was a growing awareness that technology was a
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commodity and those firms in Shenzhen with new technology 
could make it available for sale whether through sales, 
friendships, or brotherly company assistance. Considerable 
technology and expertise was acquired by the third front 
branches and transferred to inner China. It would be an 
exaggeration to say that information from Shenzhen branches 
radically changed many home companies, but it did play a 
continuing role in stimulating new practices and the 
adaptation of inland factories to the international markets. 
By 1987, 2,658 enterprises in Shenzhen had some kind of
inner link.
Brisk Shatoujiao
Commodity economy used to be less developed in Shenzhen 
due to a small consumer population. Since 1979, a sudden 
increase of Chinese and foreign consumers, tourists and 
passengers has resulted in an acute supply-and -demand 
problem.
The reform of the currency circulation system has 
facilitated the flourishing business and prosperous commerce 
of Shenzhen. In 1984, commercial units reached 5,050, an 
increase of 26.6 times over that of 1980; more than 35 
thousand people were engaged in commerce and business with a 
turnover of RMB 2 billion for social commodities, 16 times 
that of 1979.** Shenzhen is becoming a shop-window for 
famous brand native products and a new import and export
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commercial trading center.
At the southeast tip of the Shenzhen city, 17
kilometers away from the city proper, lies a new thriving 
town popularly known as "the special are a "--Shatouj iao, 
within the SEZ. The Sino-British street, less than 500 
meters long and over 6 meters wide, lies in Shatouj iao. Its 
center line serves as a border line. The southeast area is 
under Chinese jurisdiction and northwest area is still
under British jurisdiction. Yet unlike previous German
Berlin, there are no tall walls and electrical nets, nor a 
military line where nobody can cross. Instead, roads and 
bridges are unimpeded and shops are facing each other. 
People from both sides come and go freely and trade with 
each other. Anyone who comes to Shenzhen wishes to visit 
Sha t ouj iao to see the peculiar scene of "two worlds in the 
same street."
For a long time, Shatouj iao was a "dead corner" with 
a backward economy and culture, inconvenient land and few 
commercial channels. Since the establishment of SEZ, the 
peculiar geographical environment has been put into full 
utilization, and foreign capital has been introduced in a 
big way to develop industry, commerce and tourism. At the 
same time, efforts have been made to initiate estate 
development projects. These efforts have resulted in 
vigorous economic development in Shatouj iao. There are 69 
shopping centers with one thousand four hundred employees
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working there. There is a superb collection of famous 
brand commodities and that is why people call Shatouj iao "a 
paradise for shopping in C h i n a . "
Problems In Shenzhen 
(1) The shortage of labor
Despite remarkable progress since Shenzhen's inception 
in 1979, a number of basic economic problems still exist. 
Similar to the suburban fringe of many other fast-developing 
cities, the farmers of Shenzhen are easily lured to more 
lucrative employment in the non-farming sector. This leads 
to a marked decrease in agricultural production because of 
the shortage of labor. Land is abandoned and left untilled. 
Consequently, Shenzhen has had to import farmers in order to 
keep the farmland in production. Some 2,000 vegetable 
farmers were hired from the Shantou district in 1979 and 
another 25,000 vegetable farmers were hired from the
Guangzhou area in 1988. But the problem is still not
solved. According to the initial draft of the economic plan, 
Shenzhen will need as many as 32,000 farmers in 1992. Even 
without further losses, the existing 14,000 farmers active 
in Shenzhen will not be sufficient to maintain the level of 
farming production in the near future. The problem of a
shortage of labor in the agricultural sector persists, for 
the wages and returns in the farming sector are much lower 
than those in the commercial and industrial sectors.
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A shortage of labor is a problem not only in the
agricultural sector, but also in the industrial and
commercial sectors. These sectors do not lack unskilled
laborers who are easily recruited from the local farming 
sector and nearby counties, but they are short of skilled 
and semi-skilled workers. Such workers can easily find
employment in their local towns and in established inland
industrial and commercial enterprises. Although the wages
are higher in Shenzhen than in other parts of China, higher 
living costs, the lack of local recreational facilities and
the disruption of social ties discourages workers from
leaving their familiar working and social environment to 
work in Shenzhen. This is especially true of the middle-aged 
or married skilled workers.
<2) The shortage of medical and recreational facilities
Between 1979 and 1982, the expansion of medical 
facilities fell far behind the increase in population. Only 
one hospital (with 200 beds) and four clinics were
available. This was definitely not enough to meet the
demands of a city of 700,000 people. A large sum of RMB 
should be allocated to enlarge the hospital to provide
medical facilities for the expanding population of the zone. 
Recreational facilities were also lacking. Workers still 
complain that there are not enough opportunities for them to 
relax and enjoy their free time. The tourist resorts such as 
those at Xili Reservoir are far too expensive for local
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youths. Consequently, the only Inexpensive way for them to 
spend their leisure is to watch television programs 
broadcast from the Hong Kong television stations. But 
Shenzhen authorities suspect that those programs may be 
harmful to the mental health of Shenzhen citizens as their 
society is still very different from the capitalist society 
of Hong Kong.
<3) The shortage of technical and International 
experience
From its inception as a special economic zone, Shenzhen 
was expected to rely primarily on foreign capital and to 
import modern technology. These goals proved to be far more 
difficult than planners initially expected. Many joint 
enterprises and wholly foreign-owned ventures did not go 
smoothly. Considering the unrealistic hopes that Beijing had 
for attracting the latest technology at virtually no cost, 
the political pressures on Shenzhen not to make concessions 
to foreigners, and Chinese officials' low level of technical 
and international experience, it is surprising that any of 
these ventures worked at all.
Chinese companies sought modern technology, but foreign 
companies had little incentive to provide it. Shenzhen 
lacked technical staff who could use, maintain, service, and 
repair modern machinery. Provincial and national officials 
tried to provide regulations giving the assurances that 
foreigners wanted, but without sacrificing Chinese
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interests. Government officials had few staff members 
experienced in international law, and they were cautious 
about giving away too much. As of 1987, over 90 percent of 
the foreign investment in Shenzhen was from Hong Kong. But 
even Hong Kong companies were cautious; their investment was 
quite small and they too sought assurances, formal as well 
as informal.
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CHAPTER THREE 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT IN SEZ 
Evaluation of Investment Environment
In determining where to put his money, the investor 
will normally assess carefully the investment environment of 
various locations. Two different approaches are widely used 
in the evaluation of an investment environment. One is 
quantitative and the other is qualitative. The quantitative 
approach is generally regarded as more objective in nature. 
It employs a rating scale and assigns numeric scores to 
selected economic and political factors as the basis for the 
screening of the investment environment of a country. Based 
on eight screening factors, namely capital repatriation, 
foreign ownership, discrimination and controls against 
foreign business, currency stability, political stability, 
willingness to grant tariff protection, availability of 
local capital and annual inflation for the past years, a 
country's investment climate can be summed up to a certain 
numerical value. Most of these models are designed for the 
developing countries in the capitalist world, and their 
rating scale is therefore of limited use in assessing the 
SEZ of the People's Republic of China. In this chapter, the 
author adopts the alternative approach--qualitative analysis 
of the investment environment— in the hope that through such 
analysis, many key concerns of entrepreneurs and potential
27
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investors can be discussed.
The Administrative Structure
Administratively, Shenzhen is part of the Shenzhen 
Municipality which is under the Jurisdiction of the
Guangdong Provincial Government. According to the Guangdong 
SEZ Regulations, Shenzhen is also managed by the Guangdong 
Provincial Administration of SEZ which was set up to 
exercise unified management of the special zones on behalf 
of the Guangdong Provincial Peoples * s Government (Article 
3). Investors wishing to open factories or embark on various 
economic ventures may apply to the Guangdong Provincial 
Administration of SEZ. Companies have been issued licenses 
of registry and certificates for the use of land after 
examination and approval (Article 7). Acting on behalf of 
the Provincial Administration of the SEZ, the Guangdong 
Provincial SEZ Development Company was set up to administer 
economic activities in the zones. Its scope of business 
includes fund raising and trust investment, operating
enterprises or Joint ventures with investors in the SEZ,
acting as agent for investors in the zones in matters
related to sales and purchases in China outside SEZ, and
providing services for business talks (Article 25). In 
short, Shenzhen operates under the dual leadership of the 
Shenzhen Municipality and the Guangdong Provincial
Administration of SEZ. Therefore, only land development.
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investment projects and negotiations go through the Shenzhen 
Municipal Government. These various channels for negotiation 
are usually not clearly understood by potential investors, 
and this leads to unnecessary inconvenience and confusion.
The Legal System
On 26 August 1980, the Guangdong SEZ regulations were 
approved by the fifteenth session of the Standing Committee 
of the Fifth National People's Congress and thenceforth 
became effective. This was the first and most important set 
of regulations concerning the SEZ in Guangdong, and was made 
up of six chapters-General Principles, Registration and 
Operation, Preferential Treatment, Labor Management,
Administration, and an appendix-with a total of twenty-six 
articles. Concerning the management of the SEZ, five more
sets of SEZ Provisional Regulations were enacted on 17
November 1981 by the thirteenth session of the Standing 
Committee of the Fifth Provincial People's Congress of
Guangdong. These are:
<1) the provisional Labor and Wage Regulations;
<2) the Provisional Entry/Exit Regulations;
<3) the Provisional Regulations for Business Registration;
(4) the Provisional Land Regulations for Shenzhen SEZ; and
(5) the Provisional Administration Regulations for Shenzhen 
SEZ.
The first three sets of regulations are applicable to
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all the SEZ of Guangdong, while the latter two are for 
Shenzhen SEZ in particular. The five regulations were 
published in December 1981, and came into force on 1 January 
1982. Generally speaking, these regulations for the SEZ are 
supplements to the Guangdong SEZ Regulations.
In January 1984, two mor 3 sets of regulations were 
passed by the Standing Committee of the Guangdong Provincial 
People's Congress. One is the Foreign Economic Contract 
Regulations for Shenzhen SEZ. The other is the Provisional 
Regulations on the Introduction of Technology for Shenzhen 
SEZ. The first one contains seven Chapters and 41 articles. 
They aim at protecting the rights of all parties involved in 
foreign economic contracts and stipulate that Chinese
enterprises inside the zone and their foreign partners must 
follow the principle of "equality and mutual benefits" when 
they embark on economic and technological co-operation. The 
latter one contains only one chapter and 25 articles and 
covers such items as the ways in which foreign technology 
can be introduced and the transfer of patent rights. Both 
sets of regulations were specially enacted for Shenzhen SEZ 
but they could also be applied to the other SEZ in
Guangdong. Indeed, they are important landmarks in the
development of a legal system in China in general, and in 
the SEZ in particular. This is especially true in the case 
of the Foreign Economic Contract Regulations because the 
Chinese contract law covering domestic economic activities
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does not apply to activities involving foreign investment. 
The Foreign Economic Contract Regulations (which are not 
provisional) are directed at business activities involving 
foreign investors, such as joint ventures.
By 1990, new laws, regulations and rules were quickly 
worked out, including "Regulations on the Shenzhen SEZ , "
"Interim Provisions of Shenzhen City for Resident 
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises," "Procedures
of Shenzhen City Concerning the Examination, Approval and 
Registration of Foreign-Contracted Enterprises,"
"Regulations of the Shenzhen SEZ for Companies" and 
"Regulations for the Registration of Enterprises in the 
Shenzhen S E Z . " ^
With the enactment of the commercial laws and the 
greater availability of legal personnel, many mistakes made 
in the past should not be repeated. However, the commercial
laws are no substitute for arbitration agencies. Before 
1983, there was no arbitration agency or court for economic 
affairs in the Shenzhen SEZ. The absence of these 
institutions seriously hampered the proper functioning of
the zone. Li,®* a professor in the Law Department of
Zhongshan University, advocated the idea of setting up an 
arbitration system for the SEZ. He pointed out that the zone 
should follow the common practice of international
commercial arbitration in which a third party, independent 
of both contractual parties, should be appointed and
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entrusted with the authority to mediate in any possible 
dispute. He further suggested that all contracts should 
incorporate a statement of arbitration, including (a) the 
place of arbitration; (b) the arbitration agency; <c) the 
procedures of arbitration; and (d) an agreement that 
decisions of the arbitration should be legally binding so 
that disputes could be dealt with more efficiently and 
pragmatically. He also advocated that the Shenzhen SEZ 
should have its own arbitration agency to deal with disputes 
quickly and with greater understanding of the SEZ 
environment. Only in complicated cases or cases involving a 
large sum of money should arbitration follow the process 
indicated in Article 14 of the Law of the People's Republic 
of China on C h i n e s e -Foreign joint Ventures which states that
disputes arising between the parties in a joint venture which the 
Board of Directors fails to settle through consultation may be settled 
through conciliation or arbitration by an arbitral body of China or 
through arbitration by an arbitral body agreed upon by the parties.
In such cases, arbitration normally goes through the 
committee for Overseas Economic and Trade Arbitration in 
Beijing. Li's argument was endorsed by the Shenzhen SEZ 
government, and the Shenzhen Office of the Chinese External 
Trade Arbitral Committee was established on 2 April 1984. 
Moreover, eight well-known Hong Kong citizens have been
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invited to join the team of fifteen arbitrators in order to 
give confidence to overseas Investors.
A complete set of laws and a standard contract format, 
together with an efficient and just arbitration agency, are 
required to safeguard the interests of both the investors
and the Chinese government. They are also necessary 
conditions for economic growth, especially in terms of 
raising the confidence of investors and generating a more
favorable investment environment.
The Banking and Financial Structure
All the four major banks of China-the People's Bank, 
the People's Construction Bank, The Agricultural Bank and 
Bank of China-have branch offices in the Shenzhen S E Z . The
People's Bank is a general purpose bank, whilst the
remaining three are regarded as specialist banks.
Before 1982, most overseas investors in the Shenzhen
SEZ had to rely on their own sources of capital. This
explains why investment projects concluded in that period 
were either with large multinational corporations with
strong financial back-up or with petty investors from Hong 
Kong investing mainly in small projects. Medium-scale 
investment projects in which the investors were in need of a 
bank's support were relatively few. One may attribute the
lack of medium-scale projects in this period to the 
inadequacy of the banking system in the Shenzhen SEZ.
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According to published statistics, since 1982 the branch
offices of the four Chinese banks in the Shenzhen SEZ have 
been more willing to support overseas investors with loans. 
It is reported that the People's Construction Bank is 
prepared to support massive land development projects. The 
branch office of the People's Bank of China is said to be 
prepared to accept mortgages and consumer durable loans, and 
to advance loans and credits to ordinary citizens of the 
Shenzhen SEZ for private business and individual 
enterprises. Before granting the loan or acting as an 
underwriter, the bank undertakes a thorough investigation of 
the feasibility of the project and the investor's ability to 
repay. Hence, repeated examinations and investigations of
the investment project minimize the possibility of blind
investment and eventually benefit all parties concerned. 
After obtaining loans from the bank, enterprises have to 
meet standards for their system of accounting, which can 
only lead to healthier development of the enterprise. A 
well-established banking and financial system with a 
complete set of banking ordinances will provide a much 
better investment environment for investors in the Shenzhen 
SEZ.
Up to now, there are 22 foreign banks in Shenzhen. 
Among them are First National City Bank, Bank of Tokyo, 
Sanwa Bank of Japan, Commercial Bank of France, Banque 
Nationale de Paris, Banque de I 'Indochine, Hong Kong and
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Shanghai Banking Corp., Standard Chartered Bank, Royal Bank 
of Canada and Overseas Union Bank Ltd. of Singapore. All of 
them have extensive relations with other financial
institutions in the world. They have facilitated foreign 
investment and improved the zone's financial market.
Preferential Treatment and Investment Incentives
The primary objective of businessmen investing in the 
Shenzhen SEZ is to make a profit. The profit-capital ratio, 
the return period, and whether the money can be remitted
out freely are their main concerns. In deciding on the 
amount of investment and in evaluating the financial
feasibility of a project, investors have to compare the
opportunity cost of their investment. Under normal
circumstances, an investment decision on a certain project
is made only when its expected earnings are greater than 
those of other proposed projects. Apart from profit, the 
degree of risk involved is another prominent factor
affecting investment decisions. Wherever risk is greater 
because of uncertainty, the profit margin should also be 
higher. Usually, a bank deposit is regarded as the safest 
investment, so that the interest rates of overseas banks can 
be taken as the minimum desirable rate of return for any 
investment program in the Shenzhen SEZ. A longer return 
period usually means greater uncertainty and thus involves 
more risk, so that the total profit margin of these projects
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 6
muet, be higher. The estimation of risk and uncertainty is 
very subjective, being based mainly on the investor's own 
personal experience, the experience of other investors, the 
amount of information available and official guarantees. At 
present, the Shenzhen SEZ is in an unfavorable position due 
to the insufficiency of information available to investors, 
the lack of a sound legal and financial system, the 
inadequate provision of infrastructure, the lack of enough 
successful precedents to support the investor's confidence, 
and most significantly, lack of stable political 
environment. These clouds of uncertainty concerning the 
structure and the operation of the SEZ have created a fairly 
high risk factor: as a result the in'/estor must anticipate a
higher level of profit before he commits himself. Only with 
a gradual improvement in Shenzhen's administrative, legal 
and financial systems and when the general regulations of 
the zone are more thoroughly understood by outsiders can the 
risk factor be reduced. Investors may then consider projects 
with lower profit margins and longer return periods as 
viable.
The preferential terms offered in the SEZ help to raise 
the profit margin of investment. The tax exemption on 
imported capital goods for production help to reduce the 
overall cost of production. Cheap land, utility costs and 
wage rates, especially in comparison with Hong Kong, will 
increase the operating profit of investors. With these
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preferential terms, investment conditions in the Shenzhen 
SEZ are, undoubtedly, somewhat more favorable than those of
neighboring Asian countries. Nevertheless, whether these 
preferential terms are attractive depends not only on the
size of the reduction in labor wages or land utility costs, 
but also on the investors perception of whether Investing in 
Shenzhen can provide a higher profit margin, subject to the 
degree of risk involved, than investing in other parts of
China, Hong Kong, or export processing zones in developing
countries. If Shenzhen does provide a higher profit margin 
and less risk, the investment environment of Shenzhen can be
regarded as attractive and competitive. If the anticipated
profit margin is able to compensate for the degree of risk
involved, Shenzhen would still be attractive. Otherw ise,
investors will adopt a wait-and-see strategy, or simply 
direct their investment to other places.
The Tax System
Investment in the Shenzhen SEZ enjoys a more favorable 
tax rate than it does in Hong Kong or in other parts of
China. Prior to the promulgation of the regulations on SEZs
in Guangdong Province, the tax rate was not uniform 
throughout the Shenzhen SEZ. The corporate tax rate levied 
on foreign enterprises in Shenzhen was usually 15 percent.
Projects with a total investment of more than US$5 million
or projects involving advanced technology and long-term flow
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of f unds may enjoy e x e m p t i o n  from income tax for two years
and 50 percent r e duction for another three years. 
E n t e r p r i s e s  whose annual export value exceeds 70 percent of 
the total output value in the same year shall pay a 10
percent income tax.
By corparison, according to the income tax law for 
f o r e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s  applied to other parts of China, the tax 
rate ranges from 20 percent (on annual income of less than
RMB 250,000) to 40 percent (on annual income of over RMB 1 
million). In addition, a local income tax of 10 percent on 
the same t axable income is levied.
Income taxes on foreign e n t e r p r i s e s  are levied on an 
annual basis. After paying all the nece s s a r y  taxes, overseas  
inv e s t o r s  and workers in SEZ e n t e r p r i s e s  can remit their 
e a r n i n g s  out of China, provided that the special zone's 
foreign e xchange control m e asures are not violated.
I n vestors who c h o o s e  to reinvest their profits in the zone 
can apply for e x e m p t i o n  from income tax on that part of the 
profit being reinvested.
All the nece s s a r y  means of production including 
machinery, spare parts and accessories, raw materials, and
t r a n s p o r t  tools, are e xempted from import duties. Depe n d i n g  
on the i n dividual case, import d uties for consumer goods can 
also be e x e m p t e d  or ch a r g e d  at a r e duced rate. However, all 
the items have to be used or c onsumed within the SEZ,
o t h e r w i s e  d uties will be levied in a c c o r d a n c e  with the
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c u s t o m s  r e g u l a t i o n s  of China.
Similarly, f i nished and se m i - f i n i s h e d  products
m a n u f a c t u r e d  by e n t e r p r i s e s  in the She n z h e n  SEZ for overseas 
ma r k e t s  will be exempted form export duties; but if the 
p r o d u c t s  are for dom e s t i c  sale, duties will have to be 
levied. In g e n e r a l , it is intended that products of the SEZ 
s h o u l d  be exp o r t e d  to the interna t i o n a l  market. Domestic
s a l e s  are allowed only with the prior approval of the
G u a n g d o n g  Prov i n c i a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of the SEZs.
The Labor Cost and Productivity
Wage rates in the She n z h e n  SEZ are generally higher 
than those in other parts of China, but the exact amount
d e p e n d s  very much on the nature of the enterprise, the type 
of work and the level of skill required. There are four
c a t e g o r i e s  of labor in most i n d u s t r i e s  (probationary,
contract, skilled and t e chnical workers) and four dif f e r e n t
w age rates. But on average, the monthly wage rate for
w o r k e r s  em p l o y e d  in foreign e n t e r p r i s e s  is about HKS750,
w h i c h  is much lower than that of Hong Kong. In addition to 
the b asic wage, a bonus may be given to workers who have 
e x c e e d e d  their p r oduction quotas.
It is g e n e r a l l y  agreed that d e pending on the 
p r o f i c i e n c y  of the workers an annual increment in
r e m u n e r a t i o n  of 5-15 percent will be made. The w age rates 
c i t e d  above r e p r e s e n t  the amount to be paid by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 0
entrepreneur. Of this, only 70 percent goes to the workers 
as basic and fl o a t i n g  wages, 5 percent will be reserved for 
the employees' w e lfare fund and other benefits, and the 
r e m a i n i n g  25 percent is used for workers' insurance and the 
v a r i o u s  forms of subsidy that the state provides for the 
workers.
A c cording to the regul a t i o n s  on labor and wages in the 
S h e n z h e n  SEZ, the e n t e r p r i s e  is free to decide on the form 
and method of r e m u n e r a t i o n  which does not need to be a fixed 
m o n t h l y  salary. Payment can be made by hours or days, or 
a c c o r d i n g  to piece-work. V a rious kinds of reward and bonus 
s y s t e m s  are allowed, and overtime- pay is required for 
working hours in excess of those r pecif i ed in the labor 
contract. Workers are entitled to public holidays, sick 
l eave and special leave with pay a c cording to the laws of 
the P eople's R e p u b l i c  of China.
Low labor costs alone, need not be the sole a t t r a c t i v e  
l oca t i o n a l  factor. Of equal i m portance is labor p r o ductivity 
w hich depends on the e ducation and t e chnological capacity of 
the workers, their a t titudes towards work, the absentee rate 
and the d egree of r e s i s t a n c e  to new production and 
m a n a g e m e n t  methods. When S henzhen was first e s t a b l i s h e d  as 
an SEZ, i n e x p e r i e n c e  of the new eco n o m i c  and p r oduction 
system, t ogether with the gene r a l l y  low e d ucational level of 
the workers, r e sulted in relat i v e l y  low productivity, 
e s p e c i a l l y  in c o m p a r i s o n  with n e i g h b o r i n g  Hong Kong.
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F ortunately. I m p r o v e m e n t s  are g radually being made. The 
a d o p t i o n  of the piec e - w o r k  and bonus system has provided 
i n c e n t i v e s  for the workers to increase their productivity.
Inv e s t o r s  have been free to decide upon the system of
m a n a g e m e n t  of the enterprise, the recruitment and dismissal 
of workers, and the i m p lementation of work by contract and 
other forms of payment terms. It is still felt that more
l ong-term training programs need to be designed and
i m p l e m e n t e d  to upgrade further the level of labor 
p r o d u c t i v i t y .
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVE OF SEZ
Austerity Drive and Political Upheaval
On 26 A u g u s t , 1990, Shenzhen was 10 years old, yet
c e l e b r a t i o n s  were not the sort of extra v a g a n z a  one might 
e xpect of such an anniversary. The reason is that China is 
still s u ffering from the after effects of two-year austerity 
d r i v e  and the bloody u prising of June 1989.
Installed after the political upheaval of 1989, the new 
lead e r s h i p  under party general s e cretary Jiang Zemin®^ is
keen to imprint its own brand of reform and establish its
own c h o i c e  of personnel. In May, 1990, a new mayor was
a p p o i n t e d  to Shenzhen, r e placing the S 3 - y e a r -old Li Hao, who
had been in charge for the past five years. Li retains his
post as party secretary, t.hus p r oviding a smooth t r ansition
in the SEZ ' s administration.
The new mayor, 5 6 - y e a r - o l d  Zheng Liangyu, who spent 
much of his working life in Jiang's home province, Jiangsu, 
was party chief of the open city of Xuzhou before his
c u r r e n t  post. A m i l d - m a n n e r e d  and s c h o l a r l y  man, Z heng's 
s t y l e  is e x p e c t e d  to be rad i c a l l y  different from the
f l a m b o y a n t  manner of his predecessors. Partly for this
reason, S h e n z h e n ' s  10th anniv e r s a r y  c e l e b r a t i o n s  were a very 
low key affair.®"*
Even though the SEZs tog e t h e r  have ach i e v e d  i m p r e s s i v e
42
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g r o w t h  in the past 10 years, the central leadership has 
e x p r e s s e d  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the quality of the progress 
and the inefficient management. Profiteers, speculators and
tax do d g e r s  have lost no time in taking advantage of the 
e x c l u s i v e  i n centives in the SEZs, causing losses and 
d i s r u p t i o n  in s u pplies in the rest of the country.
A l t h o u g h  Beijing r e affirmed in February, 1990 that the
S EZs would co n t i n u e  to play a vanguard role in the c ountry's 
reforms and would con t i n u e  to enjoy preferential 
policies,'** the central government was non-committal about 
giving g reater a u tonomy or more financial support to the 
SEZs. In fact, the SEZs were asked to rely on their own 
e c o n o m i c  strength and the lead they had in China's opening 
to fu r t h e r  their export growth and e conomic efficiency. 
S h e n z h e n  was also asked to increase its contri b u t i o n s  to 
C h i n a ' s  central t r e a s u r y .
The central g o vernment has been cool to efforts by the
SEZs to regain some of their lost privileges, e s pecially 
f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e  r e t e n t i o n  rights. Since 1989, the SEZs have 
had to turn over 20 percent of their f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e
e a r n i n g s  to the central g o vernment in return for RMB, while 
p r e v i o u s l y  they were allowed to retain 100 p e r c e n t . This 
rule does not apply to f o r e i g n - o w n e d  enterprises.
T h e  cut in r e t e n t i o n  rights has d i s c o u r a g e d  many inland 
c o m p a n i e s  from using She n z h e n  as an export base for their 
goods, thus p a r t i a l l y  a ffecting the S E Z s ' export g r o w t h  last
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4
y s a r . Beijing wants to e n c o u r a g e  more exports of high value- 
a dded goods while the inland provinces have long been 
u n h a p p y  with their loss of export ear n i n g s  as a result of 
more a t t r a c t i v e  tax c o n c e s s i o n s  offered to the SEZs. The 
s e l e c t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of the reduced retention rights has 
f orced S h e n z h e n  to pay more attention to the development of 
its own e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d  industries, p a rticularly in sectors 
favored by the central government, such as electrical,
e l e c t r o n i c  and m e chanical industries, which are permitted 
total f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e  retention.
Much to the unhap p i n e s s  of the SEZs, the central 
g o v e r n m e n t  has insisted on a pplying p r eferential policies to 
i n d u s t r i e s  rather than to loca l i t i e s  as favored by Zhao
Ziyang, the former party general secretary, who was 
r e m o v e d  after the s tudent demonstrations. It is clear that 
the SEZs have lost priority under the new central
leadership. Instead, Beijing has shifted its focus to 
S h a n g h a i  and the s u r r o u n d i n g  Y a n g t s e  region.
Ever since the SEZ concept was implemented in 1980 as 
part of B e i j i n g ' s  expe r i m e n t  with economic reforms, the 
ce n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  has blown hot and cold towards the SEZs,
w h i c h  c o m p r i s e  Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan. 
H a i n a n  was the recent addition, b e coming both a pro v i n c e
and an SEZ in 1988.
H a i n a n  has not lived up to its promise that it would
g ive au t o n o m y  and prefer e n t i a l  policies to foreign investors
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that b ettered those offered by other SEZs. That was a 
c o n c e s s i o n  that Beijing made to compe n s a t e  for a lack of 
a d e q u a t e  f inancial support from the state. Instead, the 
H a i n a n  leadership became an early casualty of Beijing's
power str u g g l e  last year-the island's first governor fast- 
talking Liang Xiang was removed for alleged c o rruption 
i m m e d i a t e l y  following the fall of Zhao, his most important 
s u p p o r t e r  and mentor in Beijing. Liang is sill under 
investigation.
New foreign investment to the island tumbled in 1989 
and fell even more sharply in the first half of 1990, at a 
much faster rate than the national trend. Pledged foreign 
i n v e s t m e n t s  fell 26 percent in 1989 against 1988 to US$280 
million,^'* and by an aston i s h i n g  falling in the first half 
of 1990 to US$69 million.
Intern a t i o n a l  sanctions against China following the
v i o l e n t  s u p p r e s s i o n  of the pro-dem o c r a c y  movement also
a f f e c t e d  H ainan's plan to develop a second international 
a i r p o r t  at its s o u t h e r n  resort city of Sanya, with French 
and G e r m a n  loans and expertise.
For Shenzhen, new i n vestments of U S$489 million last 
year were no more than the previous year, though it has a 
better record of u t i l i z a t i o n  than the rest of China. 
U t i l i z e d  inve s t m e n t  in S h enzhen last year amounted to 93 
pe r c e n t  of p l edged investment.
S i n c e  1988, Xi a m e n ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e  was the most
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i m p r e s s i v e  among the five SEZs. Boosted by Taiwan interests, 
f o r e i g n  c o n t r a c t s  signed and utilised jumped three-fold in 
1939 against the previous year to US$835 million. In
contrast, foreign c o n t r a c t s  for the whole of China rose only
6 percent in 1989.
Xiamen is likely to overtake Shenzhen in volume of
f o r e i g n  inves t m e n t s  should direct trade established between 
C hina and Taiwan, but in the short term, this seems unlikely  
to happen, given Tai p e i ' s  firm r e s i s t a n c e  to closer ties.
X iamen and the southern Fujian coast is particularly
a t t r a c t i v e  to T a i w a n e s e  because of kinship ties, common
l a n g u a g e  and culture.
The Impact of 1997
Ch i n a ' s  largest special e c onomic zone - Shenzhen, 
across the border from Hong Kong - is in danger of being 
st i f l e d  by tradi t i o n a l  Chinese b u r e a u c r a t i c  and
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  practices. Unless c o m p r e h e n s i v e  political and
e c o n o m i c  r eforms are carried out, She n z h e n  will be unable to 
m a i n t a i n  its present pros p e r i t y  or serve a useful mediatory 
r o l e  b etween c a p i t a l i s t  Hong Kong and the socialist mainland 
a f t e r  1997 when the territory returns to Ch i n e s e
sovereignty.
The China S y s t e m  R e form I n s t i t u t e p u t s  its case in a
w i d e - r a n g i n g  and highly c ritical review of Shenzhen which 
e x p o s e s  the inner working ochanisms of this model city. In
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the past ten years, S h e n z h e n ' s  gross product has grown by an 
a v e r a g e  of 47.7 percent a year. In 19S4-19S5, She n z h e n  was 
a t t a c k e d  for its reliance on state funds for growth, for 
s p e c u l a t i v e  trading and other improper practices. S h enzhen 
has s ince made a comeback, enjoying a steady stream of 
d o m e s t i c  and foreign investment.
Behind its modern facade, S henzhen still operates with 
a c o m m a n d - s t y le hierarchy, e x c e s s i v e  political interference 
in e c o n o m i c  activity, and unfair c o m p e t i t i o n  gen e r a t e d  by 
monopolies, personal c o n n e c t i o n s  and p o l itically linked 
e c o n o m i c  favors. T h e s e  e c o n o m i c  and social r e lations are
s e r i o u s l y  ham p e r i n g  the development of the m a r k e t - o r i e n ted
economy. Price, market and planning reforms touch only the 
s u r f a c e  of the old order. Deeply entrenched, complex and 
rigid gove r n m e n t  e n t e r p r i s e s  and instit u t i o n s  still dominate 
e c o n o m i c  life in Shenzhen. Hence, freeing prices and
e l i m i n a t i n g  old - s t y l e  eco n o m i c  planning alone will not 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  c r e a t e  a fair and c o m p e t i t i v e  business 
environment. To e s t a b l i s h  a new e c onomic and social order, 
S h e n z h e n  must c o m b i n e  ec o n o m i c  reforms with political ones.
T h e  c urrent p r o s p e r i t y  means that Shenzhen does not 
feel the i m mediate need for reform. But with more C h inese
c i t i e s  o f fering p r e f e r e n t i a l  treatment, the SEZ will become 
less a t t r a c t i v e  to foreign investment. Also, as 1997 nears, 
g r e a t e r  economic, p o litical and social interaction between 
Hong Kong and S h e n z h e n  will r e quire more efficient and
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b e t t e r  m a n a g e m e n t  if the SEZ is to be an effective cushion 
b e t w e e n  Hong Kong and China. ^
S h e n z h e n  is not an oasis unt o u c h e d  by the system 
d o m i n a n t  in the rest of China. Tradi t i o n a l  values and ideas 
have made their way to the zone. Shenzhen, in its 
i n t e r a c t i o n  with the rest of the nation, follows e s tablished
r ules of the game. For example, it still uses so called "red 
letter-head" (the documents used at all levels of the
C h i n e s e  b u r e a u c r a c y  to transmit official information)
o fficial d o c u m e n t s  to regulate most e c o n o m i c  and social 
activities. Re a d e r s  are e xpected to grasp the spirit of the 
p olicy outlined through their reading of the prevailing
p oli t i c a l  climate.
The d o minant kind of e conomic rela t i o n s  in S h enzhen is
the v e r t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  type typical of the old
c e n t r a l l y  planned e c o n o m y . Under such a system, e n t e r p r i s e s  
find it d i fficult to s u rvive w i thout a super v i s o r y  official 
body, and i n d i v i d u a l s  not attached to a work unit (such as
p r i v a t e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  or small businesses) can not enjoy
s o cial we l f a r e  and other benefits. As a result, e n t e r p r i s e s
are a u t o n o m o u s  but not independent. The legitimacy of an
e n t e r p r i s e ' s  or indiv i d u a l ' s  ec o n o m i c  activity de p e n d s  on
the " u n d e r s tanding" of an official super v i s o r y  body. This 
"iron rice bowl system" c o n t i n u e s  to support h eavily 
i n d e b t e d  and i n e f f i c i e n t  state enterprises.
C o m p e t i t i o n  is fierce but unequal. E n t e r p r i s e s  in
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S h e n z h e n  have their own e s t a b l i s h e d  privileges. Foreign- 
t rade c o m p a n i e s  have import and export rights, municipal- 
level firms can approve c e r t a i n  projects, mainland firms 
o p e r a t i n g  in S h e n z h e n  have e s t a b l i s h e d  access to raw- 
m a t e r i a l  supplies, and foreign investors control marketing 
c h a n n e l s  for export. E n t e r p r i s e s  spend much energy on 
t r a d i n g  such privi l e g e s  among themselves.
To implement such progr e s s i v e  political reforms, 
S h e n z h e n ' s  special political and legal status should be set 
out in a doc u m e n t  similar to that of Hong Kong's Basic Law, 
the mini c o n s t i t u t i o n  which will outline how the ter r i t o r y  
s hould be run after 1997 and its relat i o n s h i p  with the 
c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  in Beijing.
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CONCLUSION
T h e  d ecade of rapid e c onomic reform under the 
l e a d e r s h i p  of Deng X i a o p i n g  was a time of transition from 
rule by a tiny oligarchy of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  toward a new, 
more open, and incl u s i v e  type of politics. As the leadership
s o ught to r e v i t a l i z e  the economy, they opened up channels 
for the commercialization, privatization, and internation of 
the economy. Eco n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  along these lines then 
foster ed struc t u r a l  differentiation, cultural pluralization, 
and s u b s y s t e m  autonomy. The decade witness--d some changes in 
pol i t i c a l  and economical patterns n e cessary to a c commodate
t h e s e  t r e n d s . These included a more collegial approach to
d e c i s i o n  making at the very top; r e t i r e m e n t s  and the 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of y ounger and better - e ducated officials into 
s e n i o r  decision making circles; a dec r e a s e  in the political 
i n f l u e n c e  of mil i t a r y  and s ecurity forces, thus increasing 
the inf l u e n c e  of gove r n m e n t  officials, the people's 
congress, and peo p l e ' s  political c o n s u l t a t i v e  conference; 
the r e g u l a r i z a t i o n  and i m provement of bureaucratic policy 
data gathering, analysis, and implementation; the
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of the intell e c t u a l  e lite into public policy 
d i s c o u r s e  and the lowering of secrecy barriers required to
do this; the e x p l o s i o n  of foreign c o ntacts and the growing 
impact of foreign opinion, intell e c t u a l  concepts, values, 
and m e t h o d o l o g i e s  on Ch i n e s e  policy choices; the
50
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t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of the content of the media to include much 
rich and obj e c t i v e  informât ion about c o n d i t i o n s  in China and 
elsewhere, and using SEZs as the testing ground for fast 
e c o n o m i c  growth.
The process of tran s i t i o n  to more open politics has 
only just begun after eleven years of reform. S t r a t e g i c  
d e c i s i o n  making about C h ina's future remains dominated by 
the party e lite and c o n s t r a i n e d  by the ideological and
in s t i t u t i o n a l  i m p e r a t i v e s  n e cessary to retain that 
dominance. Although the c l imate in China had greatly
i m p r o v e d  in c o m p a r i s o n  with the ec o n o m i c  stagnation and
pol i t i c a l  stal e m a t e  of 1976, many bncic political patterns
w ere linked to the L eninist political structure. Thus, they 
had r oots in the Mao era and would remain to shape C hinese 
p o l i t i c s  after Deng and his r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o lleagues were
gone.
The events of 4 June 1989 probably guar a n t e e d  what
b e f o r e  was only a p o s s i b i l i t y - t h e  e v e n t u a 1 end of Len i n i s t
r ule in China. They also g u a r a n t e e d  that China's road to 
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  will be much slower and rockier. Deng
X i a o p i n g ' s  c h oice of military r e pression destroyed what he 
had w o rked a decade to gain - a r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  and
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  of party rule and his own place in h istory as
C h i n a ' s  m o d e r n i z e r  and reunifier. It will take at least a
d e c a d e  to refill the r e s e r v o i r  of c o n f i d e n c e  among C hina's 
urban citizens, resi d e n t s  of Hong Kong and Taiwan, and
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g o v e r n m e n t  and business partners worldwide.
The Ch i n e s e  c o n s t i t u t e  one fifth of the world
population. Whoever is in power in China in the future, the
c o n s e r v a t i v e s  or the reformers, will bear in mind that a 
sound and he a l t h y  e conomy provides a stable basis for 
p oli t i c a l  power. The present regime must therefore stick
with the open-door policy, at least in some aspects, even 
though p o l i t i c a l l y  they are regre s s i n g  in most other
r e s p e c t s . The open-door policy has opened people's eyes and 
minds. There is no way to efface the p eople's political
a w a k e n i n g  or to bog down the economy. China is still the
largest untapped market in the world. The huge potential of 
this market exists apart from C hina's political situation. 
It is unwise to neglect or to abandon this m a r k e t .
It is now simply a matter of time , as the elders leave 
the s tage one by one, when martial law will be r escinded and 
its i m p l e m e n t o r s  will be r e m o v e d  from office. The a d v a n c e d  
age of the elders, the breadth and depth of o p position to 
c u r r e n t  leaders w ithin the elite, and global and regional
t r e n d s  will be important factors in this outcome. Few
s o c i a l i s t  n a t i o n s  in the midst of their own delicate reforms
w e l c o m e  C h i n a ' s  rev e r s i o n  to Stalinism. The crisis of June 
has un i f i e d  ov e r s e a s  C h i n e s e  minds and hearts in ways that
may p r o f o u n d l y  affect C h i n a ' s  future.
C h i n a ' s  c h a n c e  in the world may have to await the
e v e n t u a l  rise of a stronger middle class based on the
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r e c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of e c onomic reform along the south China 
coast of SEZs and the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of an educated and 
p r o s p e r o u s  s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l  stratum made up of modern civil 
s e r v i c e  officials, intellectuals, and economic managers.
Even these eco n o m i c  and social changes alone would not 
e n s u r e  Ch i n a ' s  full positive c o n t r i b u t i o n  humankind, that 
can come only with a deeper spiritual revival and cultural 
renaissance.
In order to maintain its unique f u nction in China's  
f u t u r e  eco n o m i c  system and comply with the critical 
s i t u a t i o n  after 1997, I r ecommend that Shenzhen:
—  further open up of the markf t to create a g e nuine  
"free i n vestment z o n e ."
- -encourage more firms to issue stocks; gove r n m e n t  
co n t r o l  over the economy would then be e x e r c i s e d  via holding 
c o m p a n i e s  rather than a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  fiat. Laws should be 
the main regulator of ec o n o m i c  and social activity.
- -make a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  eff i c i e n t  and clear; d e v o l v e  
p o w e r  to the lower levels ; allow e n t e r p r i s e s  to manage their 
p r o j e c t s  and foreign t rade f r e e l y .
— r e - o r g a n i z e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e p a r t m e n t s  to clearly 
d e m a r c a t e  more r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  at each level; standard and 
open up a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  proc e d u r e s  to enable policy c hanges 
to be t r a n s m i t t e d  promptly to indiv i d u a l s  and enterprises.
- -stre n g t h e n  leadership; while Shenzhen's chief 
e x e c u t i v e  can n o m i n a t e  his own cabinet, subject to B e ijing's
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approval, g reater public p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in politics and law 
d r a f t i n g  should e nsure super v i s i o n  of local government.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  IS  8  «
OU5
r-XV'^'^ r
"Î
I 9iu .i:
!€'
Z'r/ :-v 7 g
2 g
“  r î ^ i j i  V ' - “ - > ^  -® -® '^ '- - ° ^ -^ i- “ - - ' - ¥ ï * -  -rto»jrto«nr, ~ »jooeews
V 5'4u
' g,w-
la «
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ENDNOTES
1. Deng Xiaoping: S e c r e t a r y  General of the Communist 
party and member of the P o l i t b u r o  standing committee after 
the 1956 8th party Con g r e s s  and a chief victim of the 
C u l t u r a l  Revolution. Deng was brought back to power by Mao 
in 1974 when it was learned that Premier Zhou Enlai was 
dying of cancer. Deng became paramount leader at the 1978 
3rd P l e n u m  after years of political struggle against Mao's 
c l o s e  assoc i a t e s  and Hua Guofeng. Mow Deng is retired but 
still seises the power behind the s c e n e .
2. S h enzhen used to be a small t :;wn close to Hong Kong. 
Now it is the biggest and most successful SEZ in China.
3. Red-head documents: Official d ocuments which are 
c i r c u l a t e d  among certain a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  level. Some 
c o n f i d e n t i a l  documents can reach only down to the provincial 
level while some can reach bottom level. Those d o cuments 
s e r v e  as a kind of r e gulation which each level should abide 
by strictly. In C h i n e s e  we call it "Hong T ou Wen Jian. "
4. Chen Y u n : The most senior veteran of the revolution, 
h a v i n g  joined the select handful of top leaders in the 1930s 
and 1940s, when he served as a China's leading e c onomic 
off i c i a l  in the 1950s, early 1960s, and 1970s, with strong 
i n f l u e n c e  on ec o n o m i c  and o r g a n i z a t i o n / p e r s o n n e l  affairs
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"through the 1980s de s p i t e  age (born around 1900) and
Illness. A c o n s i s t e n t  a dvocate of a balanced sectoral 
d e v e l o p m e n t  str a t e g y  and financial caution, Chen's views put 
him on the liberal end of the political spectrum in the Mao 
e ra and the c o n s e r v a t i v e  end of the spectrum by the late 
Deng era. By 1989, he was supp o r t i n g  Yao Y ili n , Li Peng,
and Song Ping.
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